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Complexities in the process of ousting the president from office do not excuse 
presidential irresponsibility. Rather, the existence of such a procedure and the threat of 
its implementation should force the president to keep his actions in line with the Russian 
Constitution, the laws of the state and social mores.
Unfortunately, the existing Constitution of the Russian Federation excessively 
complicates the process of forcing the president to take responsibility for his actions by 
making the removal of the president nearly unfeasible for the legislative branch, and 
hence for the electorate. The practical inapplicability of the existing impeachment 
mechanism has allowed the current president to behave with arrogance and impunity. 
The absence of a credible punitive mechanism actually encouraged his repeated 
attempts to act at his own discretion, with no reference to the constitution or the laws of 
the Russian Federation.
The first paragraph of Article 93 of the current constitution states that the president of 
the Russian Federation "can be removed from office by the Federation Council only on 
the basis of a charge of treason or commission of some other grave crime, filed by the 
State Duma, and confirmed by a ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
that the [president's] actionsŠcontain the elements of a crime, and a ruling by the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation that the established procedure for filing 
the charge has been observed."
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Thus, the process of removing the president from office involves four institutions: the 
two chambers of the Federal Assembly, the Federation Council and the Duma, and the 
two highest organs of the Judicial Branch, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme 
Court.
Under the constitution, the chief characteristic of the process of removing the president 
from office is its improper conflation of two factors which ought to remain separate: the 
chief executive's political obligation to the electorate and his obligation to abide by the 
law. The threat of political responsibility was deliberately diluted in the draft of the 
constitution favored by Yel'tsin, which became the current constitution. It exists to the 
degree that the legislative branch must initiate and conduct the proceedings as well as 
render final judgment. Yet this aspect loses all meaning when the only possible grounds 
for removal are high crimes and grave criminal offenses. This confusion of legal 
responsibility and political enforcement and the nearly insurmountable procedural 
hurdles ensure that removing the president is almost impossible.
A better version of the procedure would allow for the removal of the president on 
political grounds and would omit the Supreme Court from the process, allowing it to 
conduct a trial only in the case of presidential criminal wrongdoing. It is important to 
note that the draft constitution prepared by the Constitutional Commission (1990-1993) 
of the (then) Congress of Peoples Deputies contained a far more satisfactory 
procedure. Article 96 of the draft allowed the president to be removed for deliberate 
gross violation of the constitution or for a deliberate criminal offense. The removal of the 
president from office for deliberate gross violation of the constitution would have 
institutionalized the notion of political responsibility. Boris N. Yel'tsin rejected that draft in 
the fall of 1993.
This existing ouster process is needlessly complicated by its procedural requirements. 
According to Article 93 of the current constitution, the decision of the State Duma to 
bring charges against the president and the decision of the Federation Council to 
deprive him of his office "must be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the total number [of 
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members] of each chamber on the initiative of at least one-third of deputies of the State 
Duma and provided there is a ruling by a special commission formed by the State 
Duma."
This procedure is defined by Article 93 and the fourth paragraph of Article 109 of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal constitutional law "On the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation" (Chapter 15, Articles 107-110), the 
Rules of Order of the State Duma (Chapter 22, Articles 176-180), as well as the Statute 
on the Special Commission of the State Duma regarding the evaluation of the 
procedural correctness and proper grounds of charges leveled against the president. 
This statute was ratified by a resolution of the State Duma on 19 June 1998. Together 
these documents determine the procedure for impeaching and trying the president, a 
process which can be presented simply by three stages:
The Indictment 
1. The Duma Deputies make a preliminary assessment that the president committed 
treason or another serious crime. The initiative is formulated by no less than one-third of 
the deputies in the Duma. The motion to indict the president contains specific 
references describing the criminal character of the president's actions and includes an 
evidentiary or explanatory section about the president's involvement in the given crime.
2. The Duma adopts a resolution on the formation of a Special Commission of the State 
Duma for the evaluation of the proper procedure and grounds for the charges leveled 
against the president. The Duma elects the chairman of the committee, his deputy, and 
13 commission members. The composition of the commission is formulated with a view 
to having equal representation of factions and groups of deputies. The motion to indict 
the president is sent for evaluation to the special commission.
3. The commission hears the testimony of officials and eyewitnesses, considers the 
relevant documentation and reaches conclusions regarding the questions of procedural 
correctness and grounds for the motion to indict. The resolution on the motion to indict 
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the president is supported by the majority of commission members. The voting is 
conducted by roll call. Within one week, the resolution is forwarded to the Council of the 
State Duma, which enters the matter onto the agenda.
4. The State Duma considers the motion to indict the president and the conclusions of 
the Special Commission. Two-thirds of the deputies, voting by secret ballot, accept the 
motion to indict the president on charges of treason or another grave offense for the 
purpose of removing him from office. Within five days, the Duma resolution is sent to the 
Federation Council. The motion to indict the president is sent to the Supreme Court for 
its judgment on the criminality of the president's actions. (It is important to note that 
according to Article 109 of the Constitution, the State Duma cannot be dissolved from 
the moment that charges are brought against the president.)
Court Findings 
5. The Supreme Court considers the motion and renders its judgment.
6. Within one month after the resolution is passed by the Duma, the Federation Council 
asks the Constitutional Court for approval of the procedure by which the charges were 
filed. The appeal, the text of the State Duma decision, the protocol or stenographic 
record of the Duma debate, and all the pertinent documents are sent to the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
7. The Constitutional Court determines whether the indictment process observed the 
established procedure, and sends its conclusions to the Federation Council.
The Decision to Remove from Office
8. The Federation Council considers the decision of the State Duma on bringing 
charges of treason or another grave offense against the president for the purpose of 
removing him from office, as well as the conclusions of the special commission of the 
State Duma, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and the Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation.
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9. The Federation Council has three months from the day that the Duma put forth the 
charges to vote on removing the president from office. If the Federation Council fails to 
come to a decision within that time period, then (in accordance with Article 93 of the 
constitution) the charges against the president are deemed to have been rejected.
Such is Russia's unique procedure. Once more, for the sake of comparison, it is useful 
to mention the draft produced by the Constitutional Commission (1990-1993). That 
version described a far more reasonable process: "Proceedings on the removal of the 
president from office are initiated by either chamber of the [then existing] Supreme 
Soviet (1) of the Russian Federation when a majority of all the deputies elected to that 
chamber vote in favor of a motion put forth by one-third of the chamber members. If the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation finds that there are sufficient grounds for 
removing the president from office, then the other chamber can remove him from office 
by a majority vote with at least two-thirds of the deputies voting. The president of the 
Russian Federation has the right to be present and provide explanation at the sessions 
of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation which consider the question of his removal from office."
By mid-September, the current impeachment proceedings against Boris Yel'tsin had 
reached only as far as the first three steps of the initial state--the indictment. To be 
precise, the third step had not been completed--the Special Commission still has not 
submitted the text of its conclusions to the Council of the State Duma.
According to the 205 deputies who signed the resolution containing the substantiation of 
charges against the president, he committed acts that have the attributes of grave or 
particularly grave crimes. In accordance with Article 78 of the Criminal Code, some of 
these crimes have no statute of limitations, while others are prosecutable for up to 10 
years.
Briefly stated, the legal case against the president consists of the following charges:
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• In 1991, Yel'tsin committed state treason by preparing and signing the 
Belovezhskie accords, which dismantled the Soviet Union, impaired its security 
and territorial integrity, caused great material loss to the state, and claimed 
numerous lives.
• He organized a state coup in September-October 1993 and took an active part in 
its execution. These actions are not covered by the amnesty for the persons (2) 
who were prosecuted for participation in the preceding events pertaining to 
Presidential Decree Number 1400, "On Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in 
the Russian Federation," which disbanded the Supreme Soviet on 21 September 
1993.
• Yel'tsin exceeded his powers as president by issuing the decrees "On measures 
for restoring constitutionality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen 
Republic" and "On measures to curb the activities of armed formations on the 
territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush 
conflict." (3) Both decrees were secret and, in effect, prevented the Federation 
Council from participating in the decision to use military force against Chechnya.
• While occupying the position of commander in chief of the Russian Armed Forces, 
Yel'tsin caused a substantial decline in the state's military preparedness and 
overall security. This can be considered a form of aiding foreign powers to the 
detriment of Russia's foreign security.
• The cumulative result of Yel'tsin's actions as president is the current 
socioeconomic crisis. It includes the destruction of the main branches of domestic 
industry, the ever-increasing polarization of wealth, a profound disruption in social 
security and protection, and a sharp decrease in the standard of living and the 
average life span. This substantiates the claim that he engaged in "deliberately 
inflicting on the group [Russia's inhabitants] conditions of life calculated to bring 
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about its physical destruction in whole or in part." (4) This crime is known as 
genocide.
These charges are very weighty and are based on important legal and societal 
considerations. However, there are other grounds that are perhaps even more 
convincing. The author testified before the Special Commission of the State Duma on 8 
September 1998 and described Yel'tsin's most serious transgressions:
"The president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yel'tsin, organized a grave crime--a 
coup d'état. He usurped the power of the [then] Congress of Peoples Deputies to adopt 
a new constitution for Russia. (5)
While circumventing the (then) existing constituent assembly, the Congress of Peoples 
Deputies, whose duty it was to produce the legitimate draft of the constitution, the 
president prepared an alternative draft. Having thwarted the legitimate mode of adopting 
the constitution, he rammed his own draft through the system. The decrees concerning 
the convocation of the Constitutional Conference, Decree No. 1400 "On Stage-by-Stage 
Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation," and the decree on holding the 
referendum on the constitution comprise the outstanding instances where the existing 
Basic Law was grossly violated. In fact, the president usurped the powers of the 
constituent assembly, since only the Congress had the power to adopt and amend a 
draft constitution.
As a result of presidential decrees, there arose an advisory body, the Constitutional 
Conference, which functioned despite the wishes of the Congress and the Supreme 
Soviet.(6) This body prepared the foundation for the usurpation of the constituent 
legislative bodies' powers. The referendum on the constitution represented another step 
in the usurpation. According to the law "On the Referendum of the RSFSR," which was 
in force at the time, a referendum could be held only on the basis of the constitution and 
the laws of the Russian Federation: however, the referendum was carried out under a 
presidential edict. The law on referenda insisted that the constitution could be accepted 
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by a referendum only by a majority of registered voters. Even if all the falsified ballots 
were included, only about one-third of the registered voters participated. Official election 
commissions were replaced by other election commissions that were created by 
presidential edict.
These actions testify to the fact that the president unlawfully seized the powers of the 
constituent legislative bodies by organizing an unconstitutional method of adopting the 
constitution. This illegal process served to legitimize the coup d'état perpetrated by the 
president on 21 September 1993. All the actions involved in the preparation and 
adoption of the existing constitution indicate that Yel'tsin organized criminal actions."
Despite all the evidence of Yel'tsin's wrongdoing, it is easy to imagine that the 
indictment procedure will falter with the Supreme Court decision because the Criminal 
Code of the Russian Federation--with all of its loopholes and opportunities to stall--
becomes operative at that stage. Common sense and legal logic would suggest a 
different course, however: The Supreme Court should be considering the criminal case 
against the (former) president for the crimes that would have already led to his removal 
from office!
It is no accident that the State Duma is considering a draft amendment to the Russian 
Constitution which would exclude the Supreme Court from the process. The 
involvement of the Supreme Court is not necessary since the question of depriving the 
president of his office is very different from the question of his criminal wrongdoing. The 
draft law of the Russian Federation, "On Amendments to Articles 93,103,109,125 of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation," which concerns a revision of the impeachment 
process, was on the Duma's agenda for the fall of this year.
The basic elements of the draft law propose the following changes:
• Removal of the list of legal grounds necessary for indictment procedures to begin.
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• In connection with the above, exclusion of the Supreme Court from the process of 
depriving the president of office.
• Removal of the concept of "indictment" which has been inappropriately imported 
into these proceedings from criminal law and judicial procedure.
If adopted, the amendments would make the president answerable before the people, 
since the process of depriving the president of office would become accessible to the 
people through their elected representatives, the deputies of the State Duma and the 
Federation Council.
Under the existing constitution, the most serious hurdle to the functioning of the 
impeachment process is found in Article 93, with its list of possible grounds for initiating 
proceedings against the president. As mentioned before, those grounds are treason 
against the state or another grave criminal offense. It is obvious that the task of proving 
the president guilty of such acts is a hopeless enterprise, quite beyond the Duma's 
means since it has no special discovery or judicial powers.
According to the authors of the previous draft, the very existence of a more realistic 
procedure would exert substantial pressure on the president. If a new procedure were 
adopted, the State Duma and the Federation Council could decide to initiate 
proceedings to remove the president from office in view of a particular presidential 
action against the constitution and accepted mores. The legislative bodies would have 
the power to exercise a political and constitutional check upon the presidency.
Notes: 
1 Prior to 1993, the Russian Congress of Peoples Deputies, on a rotating basis, sent a 
section of its members to form the two chambers of the more powerful Supreme Soviet. 
These legislative bodies were the predecessors of the current two chambers: The Duma 
and the Federation Council.--ed. 
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2 That is, those persons arrested for clashing with police at the Supreme Soviet and at 
Ostankino TV center.--ed. 
3 The first decree signaled the start of the Chechen war in 1994. The second pulled the 
Russian military out of the zone about three years earlier. --ed. 
4 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(1948).--ed. 
5 Unfortunately, this aspect is missing from the deputies' charges against the president. 
I advised the commission to add this charge to its proceedings. 
6 See note 1.
Copyright Boston University Trustees 1998
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal have been commissioned especially for 
Perspective. This article was originally published at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol9/Rumyanstev.html.
10
